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David A. Wendt, Noel Cressie, and Gardar Johannesson
Department of Statistics
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210 USA
ABSTRACT
There are considerable difficulties in the integration, visualization, and overall management of battle-space infor-
mation for the purpose of Command and Control (C2). One problem that we see as being important is the timely
combination of digital information from multiple (possibly disparate) sources in a dynamically evolving environment.
That is, there is a need to assimilate incoming data rapidly, so as to provide the battle commander with up-to-date
knowledge about the battle-space and thereby to facilitate the command-decision process. In this paper, we present
a spatial-temporal approach to obtaining accurate estimates of the constantly changing battlefield, based on noisy
data from multiple sources. Specifically, we examine the danger posed to a theoretical warfighter in the combat
theater. The danger-potential field generated by an enemy's weapons is defined in the spatial domain and is later
extended to incorporate the temporal dimension. We propose that maps of fields of this sort are very effective deci-
sion tools for the battle commander. Kalman-filtering techniques are proposed to facilitate the rapid estimation of
these danger-potential fields. Methods of displaying these predictions and the uncertainty associated with them are
discussed. It is the quantification of uncertainty in C2 predictions that distinguishes our statistical approach from
deterministic approaches. An application is given to a data set generated by an object-oriented combat-simulation
program that we have developed.
1. WHAT IS C2?
Command and Control (C2) and its intellectual brethren (C3, C41, etc.) are umbrella terms used to describe
a body of research and applications dedicated to preparing all branches of the armed forces for the "War After
Next" [1] . Applications incorporated into the greater C2 framework include, but are not limited to, command
applications, operations applications, intelligence applications, fire-support applications, logistics applications, and
communications applications. C2 needs are shared by all branches of the armed services. Consequently, applications
should be sufficiently flexible to work across services and across allied forces, as needed. In order to be applicable to
future wars, applications need to be able to convert a flood of data from a wide variety of sources into information
and knowledge in a timely manner.
In preparing for the Command Post of the Future, tools should be developed with the following three goals
in mind: to rapidly visualize the battle-space, to rapidly analyze the battle-space, and to rapidly understand the
battle-space. When visualizing the battle-space, the prototypical commander wants a variety of information, and
emergency information needs to be highlighted so that time-critical decisions can be made. In addition, the location
and status of friendly and enemy forces need to be available to the commander. In order to facilitate the rapid
visualization and understanding of the battle-space, to provide the ability to receive and send information while
mobile, and to begin converting that information into knowledge is critical to the battle commander. Facility for
intelligent alerting and reporting, as well as customizable tactical display elements, need to be integrated into any
C2 application.
Systems developed for C2 applications need to keep several general capabilities in mind. The military currently
suffers, not from a lack of data but from a flood of data. Data arrive from multiple sources and possibly multiple
nationalities. Data arrive in visual, verbal, and other sensor formats, and also from historical data bases. At the
same time, there is a distinct deficiency of information and knowledge. C2 applications should aim at developing
decision aids that can turn massive amounts of data into highly useful information and that reduce the number of
viable options available to the commander at key decision-making junctures. Further, even though there are large
amounts of data available, developed systems must be able to deal with missing and corrupted data. In addition to
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traditional causes of missing or corrupted data, military applications face the potential problem of hostile corruption.
In a war, it should be anticipated that data could be actively intercepted, altered, and destroyed by unfriendly forces.
Given the wide variety of battle scenarios possible in future wars, systems developed for C2 need to be scaleable
between large-scale operations and unit tactics. At the same time, these systems need to provide all war fighters
with a common picture of any particular battle-space. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, information processing
needs to be completed quickly. To the modern war fighter, time is of the essence and it is projected that speed of
processing will become even more vital in the future.
Statisticians have a unique perspective on the challenges presented by C2 and thus have an opportunity to con-
tribute to research and applications. Statistical techniques can help make the transition from the flood of data to
meaningful information and knowledge for decision making. For example, consider the area of situational awareness.
The statistician might consider probabilistic frameworks, scaleable algorithms, and sequential decision-making. In
particular, one might examine methods of estimating and predicting the threat or danger to a region, posed by enemy
constituents. Additional areas of interest are change and anomaly detection, measures of information and under-
standing, and decision theory. Statisticians should examine source data, developing methods to address confidence,
accuracy, and completeness of such data. They might also consider the validity of information-processing results
and the quality of database information. Other research areas should focus on the representation of uncertainty or
confidence in statistical results and might also pursue algorithms that allow statistical inference to be decentralized.
Note that, in addition to providing processing stability in a hostile environment, such decentralization should lead
to increased inference speed through parallel, distributed processing.
In conclusion, Command and Control (C2) is a broad field, providing a wide variety of options for statistical
research and applications. It is the specific goal of this paper to examine one aspect, namely optimal mapping of
the regional danger posed by enemy constituents in the battle-space. In Section 2, we develop a quantification of C2
for statistical analysis and define the danger-potential field in space and time. In Section 3, we examine the data
for C2 decisions and the possible degradations such data might suffer. We consider analysis of the data with regard
to estimating danger-potential fields in Section 4, and give a brief example. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize our
efforts and discuss future directions.
2. QUANTIFICATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) FOR STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS
Before considering C2 from a statistical point-of-view, it is important to examine the nature of the battle-space, D,
and the data that might emerge from it, as well as the state process of interest. By the state process, or Y-process, we
mean the underlying spatial-temporal process describing the battle, assuming perfect, noiseless, complete knowledge.
It was decided that, regardless of the choice of Y, a flexible simulation tool would be developed to produce imperfect,
noisy, incomplete data Z. To define the tool properly, a set of definitions and rules were established. In order to keep
the structure as flexible as possible, we settled on the following hierarchical design for any battle-space object.
At the largest size, the battle-space was defined to be a meta-object. For a particular simulation experiment,
the battle-space contains all the other objects in the hierarchy. The next smallest class of objects is made up of
constituents. In general, a constituent is an object that cannot be further combined (in the scope of the experiment)
with another object of that class in a meaningful way. Specific examples of constituents include the environment in
which the battle occurs, tanks and other offensive objects, and radar towers and other passive sensing objects. It
should be noted that for battles of a larger scale, a constituent might actually be a group of "smaller" objects. For
example, a group of three tanks on patrol together might be considered a constituent in a battle scenario of broad
enough extent. In the scale considered in this paper, single tanks are considered to be constituents. Constituents
are made up of elements. Elements are a smaller class of objects that have a specific sort of activity assigned to
them. A tank constituent, for example, might have one or more human elements, mobility elements, sensor elements,
and weapon elements. Elements of the environment constituent might include terrain and weather. The smallest
classes of objects in our hierarchy are functions and parameters. Functions and parameters work together to define
specifically how elements perform their activities. Functions may have deterministic or random aspects associated
with them, and parameters provide the necessary numeric arguments to functions. Again, for a movement element
of a tank constituent, functions might include a deterministic 'head straight for your target' function ('goStraight'
object) or a 'random walk toward your target' function ('goZigZag' object). Either of these functions might accept
parameters such as maximum speed, mean angle, and the standard deviations on speed and angle. Other functions
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might include functions that describe targeting error ('coneError') or other scenario-specific activities. Functions
need not necessarily be limited to acting on parameters. For instance, in more complicated models, elements of a
given constituent might interact according to some element-level function. It is conceivable that even higher-level
interactions or functions might also occur, but our analysis will focus only on the parameter-level functions for the
time being. In the design of this hierarchy, additional object classes could be inserted for more complex simulations.
For example, a component class could be inserted between constituents and elements. For more information on the
battle-space simulation developed by our group at The Ohio State University, see [7].
It should be noted that one or more commanders may be associated with each level of this hierarchy. An overall
battle commander would be associated with the battle-space at the meta-object level; at the military-constituent
and military-element levels, a commander would receive orders from the overal commander but would also direct
actions associated with that constituent or element. Even at the lowest level of the hierarchy, one can imagine a
function commander who is responsible for performing the tasks described by the function and who follows orders
from higher levels of the hierarchy.
At this point, a brief notational comment should be made. For the purposes of formulating the battle-space model
and developing the analysis, constituents are notated as vectors. Offensive-type constituents, such as tanks, are
notated Wk, where k = 1, 2 Observer-type constituents, such as radar towers, are notated v, where i = 1,2
In initial work, this vector is interpreted strictly as the Cartesian coordinates of the constituent in question, but
can be thought of more generally as the state of the constituent in question. Elements of a particular constituent
are assumed to be located at the same location as their 'parent' constituent, although this assumption could be
generalized if the constituents are distributed. When time is incorporated into the analysis, these vectors become
functions of t. Specifically, in spatial-temporal-analysis settings, offensive-type constituents are notated wk (t) and
observer-type constituents are notated v (t) . This notation refers to the location (or state) of the constituent in
question at time t.
Consequently, all our analyses are done on continuous fields rather than on grids or lattices, although the grid is
used for some numerical and visualization algorithms. For convenience, we have started with a region D that is a
rectangle of fixed dimension. In this paper, we focus on simple, fiat terrain elements, but later work will include the
effects of more complex terrain elements.
To carry out a battle-space simulation, we need to define the number, position, and type of constituents that
would exist within a battle. This could be done in advance or assigned randomly in an obvious way (e.g., Poisson
distribution [2] for numbers of objects, constrained and scaled uniform distribution or Beta distribution [2] for location
coordinates). For initial experiments, two general classes of constituents were settled on: weapons and observers.
We shall discuss observers in greater detail later (see Section 3), where data collection and degradation is considered,
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but we note here that observers are defined by functions and parameters associated with their viewing area and their
error types.
Weapons, in general, have more complicated functions and parameters than do observers. For the simplest
scenarios, only functions and parameters associated with movement and offensive elements need to be considered.
For more complicated scenarios, defensive functions and parameters need to be defined as well. Movement parameters
include such things as autoregressive parameters [3] and error types, assigned waypoints, and commands. Offensive
functions and parameters include targeting functions (such as 'coneError') and the explosion parameters used below.
Defensive parameters include amount of damage that an element can suffer and still be operational and the amount
of resistance an element carries against damage. We recognize that many additional parameters might be of interest
to the experimenter, and so provision for their inclusion later was incorporated into the design of the simulation.
For initial simulation experiments, waypoint parameters are purely deterministic, with a look to providing them
later with a random function based on commander orders and affected by environmental parameters. One way to
model this randomness is to consider the location-based error that arises from landmark-based orders. That is, a
constituent might be instructed to move to a specific landmark element within the natural or urban environment
constituent rather than to a specific set of coordinates. If the location of the landmark element is known with error,
a level of uncertainty emerges.
Recognizing that maps are an intuitive way to present knowledge, we now focus on mapping some sort of summary
of the Y-process based on imperfect, noisy, incomplete data, Z. As an example, consider the damage potential posed
by an enemy unit or set of enemy units. This should be particularly interesting to a commander, and it exhibits a
lot of space-time variability. From the damage potential, we wish to estimate a danger-potential field generated by
a set of enemy units and to examine the uncertainties associated with it. We consider our study illustrative of the
general problem of producing statistically optimal maps that evolve with the changing battle-space.
We see the damage potential of an enemy weapon as analogous to potential energy; that is, the damage done to
a target can be thought of as being equal to the damage potential of a weapon element times an armor parameter
that depends on the target's ability to protect itself. Thus, the damage potential of a given weapon element is equal
to the damage it can do to any target constituent with a unit armor parameter.
The statistical distribution of damage is examined next. Clearly, a missile applying damage at a precise, confined
location is unrealistic. As a result, all damage was considered to be of an explosive type, that is, affecting a continuous
region and being a non-increasing function of distance from the impact point. The following formula describes one
possible form of the damage potential at a distance r from the impact point:
6(r) = a(1 — (r/R)P1)P2, f' 0 < r < R,
0, else, (1)
where a, R, Pi and P2 are all explosion parameters defined for the weapon element in question. Under this definition,
a single location in the battle-space can be affected by damage resulting from nearby impacts in the space, and the
damage potential will vary with distance from the impact.
Before continuing, consider the following notational conventions. Let WkL denote the lth location impacted by
weapon Wk , allowing a single weapon to possibly have multiple 'hits' in a short, specific time interval. For the
purpose of this paper, attention will be focused on single-impact weapons with the impact denoted Wkl . Further,
denote f(wkl S Wk) as the probability density function of an impact at location Wkl ,given the weapon is located
at Wk and is aiming at location s. Similarly, let v, denote the jth location observed by observer i in a specific time
interval. Notice that enemy weapon constituents may not always be distinguishable by an observer and, thus, we
do not know in general which weapon v refers to. However, for the purpose of this paper, we will assume that the
observe can identify the weapon without ambiguity, and we let jk denote the location observed by observer i for
weapon k.
We define the danger-potential generated by a single weapon element at location Wk ,as the expected damage at
any location s:
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g(s;wk) f ö(rS,Wkl)f(wklls,wk)dwkl; S E D. (2)
Wk 1
The distribution, f(wkl Is,wk), is based on the same radius-angle probability distribution given in Section 3. It should
be noted that, given the parameters of a given weapon, g(s; wk) can be computed ahead of time, thus reducing the
amount of time it takes to generate a danger potential over D.
We further assume that danger is summable. That is, we define the danger potential to an object at a specific
location, from a set of enemy weapon elements, as the sum of the individual danger potentials of each weapon
element. Such a definition makes sense if the individual damage potentials are summable, as we now illustrate. The
danger potential at s is,
g(s) = f ö(rS,Wkl)f(wk1Is,wk)dwk1 (3)
Wkl k
= : fWkl 6(7'8,""1 )f(wkl Is,Wk)dWkl (4)
= g(s;wk), (5)
where Ek 6fr8,Wkl ) is the damage potential of the multiple weapons {Wkl}.
Though danger potential was defined above in a purely spatial setting, there is a natural extension to the spatial-
temporal setting. Consider an offensive constituent at location Wk (r) , and time r. Then the expected damage
potential at location s and time t > r, not only depends on the probability of applying damage, but also on the
probability of the weapon's location at unobserved times. That is, we wish to take an expectation on the targeting
distribution as in (2), but the expectation of the damage at a given spatial-temporal location is now based on
knowledge of the weapon's location at some prior time (r) . The resulting danger-potential field at s and t is:
gt(s;wk(r)) = f S(rS(t),Wkl (t))f(wkl (t) Is(t), Wk (t))dwkl (t) (6)
Wkl(t)
= f ö(rS(),Wkl() ){f f(wkl (t), Wk (t) Is(t), Wk(r))dwk (t)]dwkl (t) (7)Wkl(t) Wk(t)
= f f (rS(),Wkl (t))f(Wkl (t) Is(t) , Wk(t))h1 (wk (t) Iwk (r))dwk (t)dwkl (t) (8)
wkl(t) Wk(t)
= f g(s(t); Wk(t))hl (wk (t) lWk (T))dwk (t) . (9)
Wk(t)
The probability density function, hl(wk(t)Iwk(r)), represents the conditional probability that the weapon is at
Wk(t) given that it was at spatial-temporal location wk(T), which introduces a dynamic aspect to the analysis. The
probability depends not only on the movement function and the parameters associated with the weapon element,
but also on the evolution of the spatial-temporal battle-space. For instance, if the weapon element is damaged, its
mobility may be affected. In the simple example discussed in this paper, the weapon cannot be damaged, so that
part of the dynamic aspect may be ignored. Expanding this conceptualization, one might re-write (8) and (9) as:
gt (s; W) = i:f f 6(r8 ,Wkl (t) )f(wkl (t) Is(t),Wk(t))h1 (wk (t) IW)dwk (t)dwkl (t) (10)k Wkl(t) wk(t)
= i:I g(s(t); Wk(t))hi (wk (t)IW)dwk (t) (11)k Wk(t)
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where W the set of all known information and h1 (wk(t)IW) is the conditional probability density function describing
the probability that a weapon is at a specific location in space-time, given knowledge of all weapons at various
locations in space-time.
In the proposed conceptualization, data are primarily observed locations of military constituents. That is, at a
given time point, each observer constituent provides a list of Cartesian coordinates representing its observed locations
of other constituents. Note that these observed locations are almost certainly noisy and perhaps compromised through
censoring or enemy interference. The nature of the error associated with these data is discussed further in Section 3.
Given the data, our goal in this article is then to estimate and map the true danger potential everywhere in the
spatial-temporal region of interest. Information about the parameters of the weapon constituents and observer con-
stituents is combined to generate estimates of the danger potential. An advantage of the spatial-temporal statistical
approaches discussed in this paper is the flexibility of the questions that might be answered using the data. Simple
questions about the location of a weapon or a set of weapons are not the only ones that are answerable. In addition,
one might pose questions such as, "How often are enemy weapons within 10 miles of the border?" or "Does the
danger posed to friendly regions appear to increase significantly over time?" Given the form of the danger-potential
field, all of these questions are non-linear, and thus techniques such as Kalman filtering {5] will typically yield biased
estimates. However, the development of covariance-matching maps may prove to be more successful in representing
and answering these queries.
3. DATA FOR C2 DECISIONS
Once a simulation of the Y-process has been completed, it is time to consider the collection of data. Generating
and running the simulation gives the experimenter access to the true battle information, but in real-world situations,
the information is degraded in some manner. To reflect this, we degraded the simulated Y-process in several ways.
Censoring might occur in both the time- and space-domains for various reasons. Terrain features might limit the
observation region of an observer, and technical difficulties might prevent or delay observation of data. Location-
based error was also deemed to be a fairly likely situation. Less likely, but worth considering, was false data provided
by the enemy.
Location-based error is worth particular focus for at least two reasons. First, of all the possible degradations,
it seemed to us to be appropriate to include it in all experiments. Additionally, in the battle-space definition, the
radius-angle distributions primarily used for this error appear repeatedly. While standard bivariate normal error
might be applied to any location and is indeed applied for satellite-type sensors, radar-type sensors and weapon-
targeting applications within the battle-space simulation were given radius-angle error distributions. That is, the
angle and distance between the observer and the observed, or the weapon and the target, are computed. It is assumed
that these coordinates are reported with the following error structure. If the true angle is 0o, then the reported angle
0 is:
690+EO, (12)
where E is distributed with mean 0 and variance u . If the true distance is ro , it is assumed that the reported
distance coordinate r is randomly distributed with mean ro/(1 —u) and variance cr. Note that if r is unbiased
for r0 then it can be shown that the observations of the weapon location are biased. The choice of the mean value
ro/(1 — -o), represents an adjustment for that bias; see Section 4.1. These coordinates are then converted back into
the standard Cartesian coordinates used to describe all constituents in the battle-space.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1. Details of Analysis
For the purpose of this paper, the goal of the analysis is to estimate the true danger-potential field of a battle-space
over time. Note that the deterministic danger-potential field is well defined if the true distribution of the impact
location and the location of the firing weapon is known. Since the former is likely to be known from intelligence
sources, our focus is on the latter. Consequently, we wish to estimate the true danger potential in the face of
unknown weapon locations. We discuss two possible approaches, whose differences we will investigate in the future.
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One approach is to apply Bayesian methods [4]. In this case, one might generate an ensemble of danger-potential
fields through the weapon element's posterior location distribution. An alternative approach is to apply some sort
of 'plug-in' estimate for the locations of the offensive constituent(s). Under this approach, the estimate might be
achieved by replacing the true location of the weapon elements with estimates of the same, obtained from the data.
Regardless of the approach used, an estimate of the posterior probability distribution of the locations of the
weapons, given the observations, would be useful. When dealing with the radius-angle errors described earlier, the
distributions of the observations can be complicated to represent. However, second-degree Taylor approximations
can be used to approximate the mean and the (2 x 2) covariance matrix of the observations with reasonable accuracy.
We now give a calculation for the radius-angle error structure.
Figure 2. Notation Conventions
vi, v2(t) the location (state) of observer i (at time t)
ik , ik (t) the location of weapon k observed by observer i (at time t)
Wk , Wk(t) the true location (state) of weapon k (at time t)
Wkl, Wkl(t) the 1th location impacted by weapon k (at time t)
s, s(t) a hypothetical location (at time t)
rSWk the Euclidean distance, IIwk _ sil,
between weapon k at Wk , and the target location s
rWkWkL the Euclidean distance, IIwkl _ WkII,
between weapon k at Wk , and the impact location wkl
rSWk, the Euclidean distance, IIwkl —s, between
the impact location Wkl and the target location s
9SWk the angle, arctan[(wkY — Sy)/(Wk s)},
between weapon k at wk , and the target location s
9WkWkj the angle, arctan[(wkl —Wk)/(Wkl _ Wk)],
between weapon k at wk , and the impact location Wkl
9SWkl the angle, arctan[(wklY — sy)/(wkl s)J, between
the impact location wkl , and the target location s
etc.
Before examining this approximation, the following facts are worth noting. Second-degree Taylor approximations
show that cos(9) is approximately equal to 1 — and sin(9) is approximately equal to 0. Similarly, cos2(9), sin2(8)
and cos(O) sin(O) are each approximately equal to 1 —2 , 2 , and 0 respectively. Assuming the same distribution on
the distance and angle as discussed above, consider the observation, Vik (Vk , Vjky). Write jk as V2 + Vjk where
4Vk I.ix = r cos(O), /.ty = r sin(9), and 0 = + . Combining these equalities and an assumed
independence of r and 0, we obtain
E[vjkJ = E[v + i' cos(OVWk + Eg)]
= vix + E[rJE[cos(OVWk + fe)]
= vix + TViwk2 cos(OVWk )E[cos(fo)] — sin(OVIWk )E{sin(f0)] , (13)1 —
where the last equality is given by the assumptions following equation (12). Applying the Taylor approximations,
we obtain
E[vjk] v + 1rVk2 {cos(OVWk)E[1 — f} — rVWk sin(OVWk)E{cO}] = v + rVWk cos(OVWk). (14)
A similar approach can be used to compute the expected values of Viky , V Vy and Vikx Viky . With these expected
values, the approximate expected value and covariance matrix of jk can be computed. After simplification, we
obtain
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E[vk] Wk (15)
var[vk] [a — rV.Wk(1 _ 'rny) c7(cT + rVWk'y)}pp + [7 + rVW'y]cr0qq , (16)
where p = (cos 0VjWk ' Sfl 0VjWk )' q = (sin 0VjWk C05 0vw,, )' and " (1 — 1a2)2 . Note that the covariance matrix
above involves the unknown angle 9ViWk it is suggested that the observed angle 0ViVik be used in its place.
More generally, consider the following model for data obtained by observing the offensive constituent wk from an
observation constituent, v. The resulting observation, Vik ,can be expressed as:
Vik Wk + ejk, (17)
where ejk 5 a random vector with mean zero and 2 x 2 covariance matrix depending on the type of error distribution
associated with the observer, as well as the relative position of the observation constituent with respect to the
offensive constituent. In the case of the observation constituents being radar sites, we assume a radius-angle error
distribution and the covariance matrix of jk is given by (16).
Thus, for observations on Wk from multiple observers, , . . . , M, the following model applies:
I Vlk\ (1k\




12G= : ' (19)
12
and the ik are independent (2 x 1) zero-mean error vectors with covariance matrix, E, as given by (16). Notice
that G is a (2M x 2) matrix, Wk is a (2 x 1) vector, and the other vectors represented above are (2M x 1) vectors.
The generalized least-squares estimate for Wk is then
1k
Wk (G'E1G)'G'E' : , (20)
VMk
where
o . . . 00 2 0
E=
: : . : (21)
0 0 . . .
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and recall that >2 is given by (16). This is a rather crude estimate, and we are currently exploring forecasting
methods that incorporate past temporal information.
For example, consider the spatial-temporal danger potential defined in (11). Then the expected damage at time
t given past observations, V = {vkfr):r < t ; k = 1, 2, . . .}, for the enemy weapons, can be obtained as follows:
t(s;V) = fgt(s;W)f(WIV)dW (22)
= I [I g(st; wk(t))hl(wk(t)IW)dwk(t)]f(WIV)dW (23)w k Wk(t)
= i: f g(st; wk(t))[f hl(wk(t)IW)f(WIV)dW]dwk(t) (24)k Wk(t) W
= : I g(st;wk(t))h(wk(t)V)dwk(t) , (25)
k Jwk(t)
where h(wk(t)IV) is the conditional probability density function describing the probability that a weapon is at a
specific location in space-time, given the observation of all weapons at various locations in the past. It should also be
noted that at times where observations are not taken or are incomplete, the danger potential will tend to spread out
as the uncertainty about the location of the weapons increases. The calculations leading to (25) require modification
if V also contains current observations {vk (t): k = 1, 2, . . .}; this results in a filtered (rather than a forecasted)
space-time danger potential. These calculations will be reported on elsewhere.
4.2. Small Example
By way of an example, consider a small scenario involving tank manuevers. A 100-mile by 100-mile piece of border
territory is observed by two radar stations positioned in the friendly southwest and southeast corners of the region.
The region is of interest because two groups of mobile enemy weapons have been detected in the area; there are no
friendly units in the region, so that the commander is watching for potential enemy invasion. The radar stations
provide noisy location data with a radius-angle error distribution described earlier. The radar stations have a limited
range but provide data at consistent time intervals without any missing data.
The enemy weapons include two tanks coming from the northwest corner of the region and three tanks coming
from the northeast corner of the region. In the simulation, all of the weapons are assigned a series of waypoints,
which represent their orders for the maneuvers. The groups move along two separate paths and appear to converge
on a single location as the operation progresses. Waypoint parameters might be assigned to a mobile constituent as a
tactical decision made by a battle commander, or in response to known terrain elements. In more complicated simu-
lation experiments, weapon components might be given the ability to assign or alter their own waypoint parameters
in response to newly observed data about the terrain element.
It is important to note that, for this example, the parameters for the weapons and observers are not intended to
reflect real-world capabilities. Rather, we chose the parameters to illustrate how the danger-potential field can be
mapped. Also, for simplicity, we show maps of the danger potential using the true weapon locations rather than the
estimated location. See Section 4.1 for discussion of weapon-location and danger potential estimation.
While the overall danger-potential field generated by these vehicles could be examined as it evolves over time,
attention will be focused on three time slices for the purpose of this demonstration. In particular, we shall map
the danger potential at the start of the scenario, at 120 minutes, and at 240 minutes, where each of the images
are presented in the same logarithmic grey scale. It should be noted that the mapping of danger potential was
originally conceptualized in a white-to-red color scale but that, even in grey scale, the additive properties of danger
are discernable. The shape of the danger-potential field for each tank was pre-computed, so that the overall map
could be generated quickly using the additivity property described in (5).
In the first image (Figure 3) we see the danger-potential field at the beginning of the scenario. Note that the
danger-potential fields of the individual tanks are still discernable in the upper right and upper left corners of the
image.
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Figure 3: Danger-Potential Field at Beginning of Scenario
In Figure 4, we see the simulated battle scenario after two hours of observation. Note that each group of tanks
has closed ranks. That is, the two tanks on the left and the three tanks on the right are traveling in close proximity.
As a result, the danger-potential fields cover a smaller total area and have higher intensities over the regions they
cover. However, the total danger integrated over the entire observed region has remained constant from the begining
of the scenario until now.
Figure 4: Danger-Potential Field at 120 Minutes
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The final image (Figure 5) is a representation of the danger-potential field four hours into the scenario. Note that
all of the tanks are now traveling in close proximity. This results in the highest danger potentials of the scenario,
but over an even more limited total area than at the first or second time points under consideration.
Figure 5: Danger-Potential Field at 240 Minutes
5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In examining the ways in which statistics can contribute meaningfully to problems in Command and Control, our
research efforts at The Ohio State Unversity [6] are based on our belief that maps are an effective way of representing
knowledge and uncertainty. We have developed a hierarchical design and notation for discussing the hypothetical
battlespace, which has led to the postulation of danger potential as an information tool of interest to the battle
commander.
The danger-potential field has a number of desirable properties. First, the fields are summable, so that the
effect of additional weapons can be easily incorporated into the C2 statistical analysis. In addition, danger potential
extends naturally to spatial-temporal fields. Since the form of the danger potential of a specific weapon can be
precomputed and can be represented concisely as a function of the weapon location, a spatial-temporal picture of
the danger-potential field can be developed quickly, assuming the location of the weapons are known.
The weapons' locations are often unknown and we are exploring two approaches to incorporating the location
uncertainty into the danger-potential field: plug-in estimation and full Bayesian inference. Covariance-matching
kriging methods are being considered for plug-in estimation and sequential-imputation methods are being considered
for Bayesian inference.
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